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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee. ] 
vs. ] 
WAYNE WARDLE, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ' 
| Case No. 890372-CA 
1 Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby petitions the Court for 
rehearing on the grounds and for the reasons that this Court (The 
Honorable Norman H. Jackson [presiding], Regnal W. Garff, and J. 
Robert Bullock) was not afforded the opportunity of reviewing the 
Reply Brief which Defendant timely served on March 2, 1990, and has 
overlooked or misapprehended certain issues of law and fact which 
were addressed in the Reply Brief. A copy of the Slip Opinion is 
attached as Addendum "A". A copy of the Reply Brief is attached 
hereto as Addendum "B" and the legal authorities cited therein are 
incorporated by this reference. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Following a review of the decision on appeal, counsel 
contacted the clerk's office on June 18, 1990, to determine whether 
or not the Court had in fact received the Defendant's Reply Brief. 
Counsel was advised by Sheri Knighton, deputy clerk, that the clerk 
1 
had in fact received the Reply Brief but stated that the brief had 
never been docketed nor copies distributed to the judges for review 
in connection with the decision in the case. 
2. The Court has overlooked or misapprehended the 
following points of law and fact: 
a. The Court apparently concluded that the prosecutor's 
alternative fraud theory was supported by competent evidence and 
that, therefore, the alternative theory was not used merely as a 
"vehicle for prejudicing the defendant." Slip Opinion at p.4. 
Accordingly, the prosecutor's insurance fraud theory and argument 
based on the inflation of the proof-of-loss statement was not 
objectionable nor trial counsel's failure to object thereto indicia 
of /^effective representation. Slip Opinion at p.6. These 
conclusions completely overlook the fact that the evidence offered 
in support of the alternative fraud theory was objectionable 
hearsay and, although admitted without objection, would not have 
supported a conviction based on the alternative theory. This issue 
is briefed at pages 2 through 5 of the Reply Brief. 
b. Unfair and prejudicial impeachment is not limited to 
examination involving inquiries relating to prior criminal 
convictions. This point is briefed at pages 6 through 8 of the 
Reply Brief. The Court's opinion overlooks or misapprehends the 
law on this issue or the facts surrounding the issue. 
c. The Court concludes that the line of questioning 
regarding prior civil judgments was not prejudicial to the 
Defendant because "he admitted having five or six civil judgments 
2 
against him." Slip Opinion at p.4. The Defendant admitted having 
"probably f i v e or si x judgments aga I nst me through my history. H 
When asked specifically about outstanding judgments *r* T9P6 the 
Defendant testified that he did not recall whether or not he had 
any judgments against h i m at t] lat ti me bi it acini i tted tl lat he 
probably had "a couple" and specifically identified a judgment in 
favor oi Western General Dairies in the amount of $762 and a 
judgment in favor of Conlee Company iii 'he did -urit ot "Five inx; Six 
Thousand ($5,000 or $6,000) Dollars." (T. 354-355). In concluding 
that the questions regarding civil judgments against the Defendant 
were proper inquiry concerning the Defendant's fi nancial sta tus and 
provided a motive for arson and insurance fraud, the Court failed 
to recognize the fact that the Defendant conceded only two 
judgments against him during a time frame which would have any 
relevance to the issue of motive. The Court also failed to 
appreciate the fact that the Defendant steadfastly denied changing 
his business name and bank accounts or changing the form of 
business organization for the purpose of avoiding creditors and 
that the prosecutor failed to offer any ev i (lei ice In support of the 
innuendo created through his cross-examination. Again, this issue 
is briefed at pages 6 through 8 of the Reply Brief. 
c, error to insti net t; lie jui y that, a reasonable 
doubt must be a "real, substantial doubt, not one that is merely 
possible or imaginary." The error was preserved for review by 
trial Lounse I " i- except ion in tin.1 'lisi-fi- I ''Quirt's refusal *•» qwe 
the proposed "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction. This 
3 
issue was briefed at page 27 of the Appellant's Brief and pages 9 
through 11 of the Reply Brief which cited and quoted from State v. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989). The prejudical effect of the 
"possible or imaginary" language is more pronounced in this case 
because, unlike Ireland, the instant case is based strictly on 
circumstance. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that 
the rehearing should be granted so as to allow the Court the 
opportunity to reevaluate its decision in light of the authorities 
provided by way of Defendant's Reply Brief. 
DATED this 20th day of June, 1990. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON) 
Gary W. Pendleton, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says that he is the above named and is an attorney, licensed to 
practice law in the State of Utah; that he has read the foregoing 
document and knows the contents thereof and hereby verifies that 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing is filed in good faith and not 
for the purpose of delay and that the same is true of his own 
4 
knowledge except as to those matters therein stated on information 
and belief, and as to those he believes them to be true. 
hi 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of June, 
1990. 
/ * / 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at St. George, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 5/31/1994 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this 2flth day of June, 1990, 
I did personally mail four true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing document to R. Paul Van Dan, Utah Attorney General at 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. hi 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wayne Wardle, 
Defendant and Appellant-
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
rJUN 151990 
__ooooo~~ cA^$lm&. ** Court 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890372-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Gary Pendleton, St. George, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Bullock.1 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Wayne Wardle appeals his jury convictions of aggravated 
arson, a first-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-103 (1990)/ and insurance fraud, a second-degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1990). We affirm. 
Wardle raises five issues on appeal: (1) insufficiency 
of the evidence; (2) denial of due process; (3) improper expert 
testimony; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) 
refusal of jury instruction. 
Wardle owned and operated A-l Maintenance in an old home 
in Murray, Utah. He was at the business for one-half hour the 
morning of October 20, 1986. About thirty minutes after he 
departed, the Murray City fire department was dispatched to the 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1989). 
business. The firefighters arrived four minutes later and 
found the building ablaze. 
Investigators agreed that the point of origin of the fire 
was adjacent to Wardle*s desk in his office area. They 
discovered a soldering iron next to his desk that had been 
burning for several days and had penetrated the carpet, pad and 
one-half inch into the underlying particle board. The burn 
pattern around the iron was consistent with the use of an 
accelerant, such as flammable liquid. Tests revealed the 
presence of a light range hydrocarbon, an accelerant, in the 
carpet. Investigators concluded that the fire was 
intentionally set. They concluded that the iron would not 
ignite flames without the aid of an accelerant or manipulation 
of a garbage bag to create a bellows effect. All investigators 
agreed that, on that morning, Wardle could not have avoided 
seeing or smelling the burning produced by the iron. 
Wardle1s building was insured for $30,000. His one-year 
policy became effective three months prior to the fire. The 
insurance claims investigator described the building as a 
Mshack" that could have been replaced for about $13,000. After 
the fire, Wardle says he was not too concerned about the 
building because he was planning to demolish it anyway, which 
he did for $450. He said he had received bids for demolition 
at $1,700-$1,800 and had a loan for a new building. He also 
stated that the fire did not affect his ability to continue in 
business because it was his off-season and there was little 
equipment or furnishings in the building. 
Wardle retained a public adjustor to prepare an insurance 
claim and filed his claim for $24,984.75. Wardle signed the 
proof of loss statement. The claim was settled for $15,900. 
We will examine the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the guilty verdicts on both charges. When reviewing a 
claim that the evidence was insufficient, we must view the 
evidence and all inferences that may be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 117 (Utah 1989). If there is evidence from which the jury 
could have found all the elements of the crime, our inquiry 
must stop and the conviction must be affirmed. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
First, we will examine the evidence supporting the 
verdict of aggravated arson. Section 76-6-103(1) provides in 
relevant part: 
a person is guilty of aggravated arson if 
by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure!!.] 
Three arson investigators examined the cause of the fire: Dean 
Larsen, Murray City fire marshall and assistant chief; John 
Blundell, at Larsen's request; and James Ashley, at the request 
of Wardle*s insurer. Each testified that the fire was 
intentionally set. Further, the State chemist's discovery of 
hydrocarbon, a fire accelerant, in carpet samples was 
consistent with the investigators' determinations that the 
carpet burn patterns revealed the use of an accelerant. Wardle 
was on the premises shortly before the fire was discovered, and 
he was there at his desk when the smoldering soldering iron 
could not have been overlooked. The door was locked and Wardle 
had the keys. Wardle's only explanation for the fire was that 
he must have kicked or moved a paper sack full of garbage onto 
the smoldering iron that morning without noticing what he had 
done. The jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence 
before it that Wardle had intentionally started the fire. We 
find sufficient evidence in the record to support Wardle's 
conviction of aggravated arson. 
Next, we will examine the evidence supporting the verdict 
of insurance fraud. Section 76-6-521 provides: 
Every person who presents, or causes 
to be presented, any false or fraudulent 
claim, or any proof in support of any such 
claim, upon any contract of insurance for 
the payment of any loss, or who prepares, 
makes or subscribes any account, 
certificate of survey, affidavit or proof 
of loss, or other book, paper or writing, 
with intent to present or use the same, or 
to allow it to be presented or used, in 
support of any such claim is punishable as 
in the manner prescribed for theft of 
property of like value. 
Wardle submitted to Ohio Casualty Insurance Company a 
"Sworn Statement In Proof of Loss." The statement contains the 
following affirmation: "The said loss did not originate by any 
act, design or procurement on the part of the insured or this 
affiant." The document was duly subscribed and sworn to by 
Wardle. The jury, having found Wardle guilty of aggravated 
arson, could only conclude that the above affirmation was 
false. This evidence alone is sufficient to support Wardle*s 
conviction of insurance fraud. Thus, we do not need to 
consider the State's claim that evidence of the inflated values 
listed in the proof of loss statement was sufficient to support 
the insurance fraud conviction. 
Wardle framed his due process argument as follows: 
"Defendant was denied due process as a result of unwarranted 
and prejudicial attacks upon his character and credibility." 
His first complaint is that the State inappropriately used the 
insurance fraud count as a "vehicle for prejudicing the 
defendant." Wardle fails to cite a single authority in support 
of this point or to demonstrate that it constitutes a denial of 
due process. Wardle1s second due process complaint alleges 
unfair prejudice from "unwarranted attacks related to his 
financial circumstances." Again, Wardle has not cited any 
authorities which mention due process. The only Utah case 
cited is State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986), which is 
not on point. That case involved impeachment of a defendant 
based on prior criminal convictions. Here, Wardle was not 
asked about any prior criminal activity or convictions. He was 
asked about some civil judgments bearing on his financial 
condition prior to the fire, and he admitted having had five or 
six civil judgments against him. Wardle has failed to properly 
articulate his due process claim or cite supporting authority 
for this argument. We think that it was proper to inquire 
about Wardle1s financial status as revealing a motive for arson 
and insurance fraud. See People v. Folsom, 220 Cal. App. 2d 
809, 34 Cal. Rptr. 148, 150 (1963). 
We turn next to Wardle's claim that his conviction was 
based on "improper 'expert1 testimony." He complains about the 
following testimony: (1) Larsen was asked, "What is your 
theory of the case, how did this fire start?" He replied, "My 
opinion is that the soldering iron was put there prior to the 
actual fire itself; that it smoldered for quite some time 
without getting in complete combustion or the fire stage; that 
it was discovered by Mr. Wardle and that he accelerated it, put 
some type of flammable liquid on it to get it started and then 
left." (2) Ashby was asked whether he was "able to form some 
kind of theory as to what happened here?" He stated that the 
soldering iron was placed on the floor with a bag of garbage on 
Thursday, that Wardle went back to investigate, found the bag 
slow burning and used something to create an open flame and 
left. He believed the smoldering iron "would have been very 
noticeable, the smoke, the odor, something, something should 
have told Mr. Wardle that things were amiss." (3) Blundell 
summarized, "[B]asically what we're saying is that the 
890372-CA 4 
defendant lied about what he found when he walked into the 
bull ding that morning because smoke would have been present 
Wardle directs us to Utah Rules of Evidence 704 and 
the basis for his argument that admission of the above 
testimony was "manifest error," Those rules provide: 
i \ i i 11« V I I I il , HI )|J i in i n i l in ill I r i in a I i > i n p m i . 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an 
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fart 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence 
on ground of prejudice, confusion, or 
waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence 
excluded if its probative value 
substantially outweighed by the danger cf 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issups, 
or misleading the jury, or by 
consideration of undue delay, waste 
time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence, 
W
 a r <j 1 e a r g u e s t h a t 11 i i s t e s t i m o n y f r o in t h e e x p e i: t s s h o m 1 d 
have been excluded because its probative val ue was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jur y. His argument 
simply regurgitates the language of the rule, Then he cites 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), as requiring 
reversal of his convictions "based upon the err'^neous and 
prejudical admission of expert testimony."2 
waraie undertook n o anax>i;I^  oi ^i.i^g^^i. **.. 
his case, but simply shared a quote from page 3 
We remain w arj oi the potuiii.u. ^ 
evidence to distort the fact-finding 
process by reason of its superficial 
plausibility and its potential for 
inducing fact finders to accept expert 
judgment on critical issues rather than 
making th* i * '" 
2. Besides Rimmasch, Wardle cites only State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 
89, 60 P.2d 952, 958 (1936), in support of his claim of 
n
mani fest erro r " based oi I i niproper expei; t test imony. 
c 
We note that Rimmasch treats Rules 608(a) and 702, which Wardle 
has not mentioned. Wardle argues further that the following 
rhetorical question by the prosecutor during closing argument 
suggested to the jury "that it may forego independent analysis 
of the facts" and decide the case on a single issue: 
Do you believe these three arson 
investigators when they reached the 
conclusion that this was an intentionally 
set fire, or do you believe the defendant 
when he says it was an accident? 
To us, this question sets the issue correctly as one of 
credibility. The parties each had a theory concerning the 
cause of the fire, i.e., intentional or accidental. The jury 
believed the experts and not Wardle. Credibility of witnesses 
is a matter for the jury to determine. State v. Baqley, 681 
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). 
Next, Wardle contends his trial counsel was ineffective, 
resulting in a denial of his sixth amendment rights. In 
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we must 
determine that counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that defendant 
was prejudiced. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). 
First, Wardle contends that counsel should have objected to 
the prosecutor's insurance fraud theory and argument that 
Wardle's proof of loss statement was inflated because that 
theory was unsupported by the evidence. However, Wardle 
ignores testimony that his building was valued at $13,000 and 
that he accepted $15,900 after submitting a claim for $25,000. 
Further, Wardle testified that he would have been happy to 
receive $5,000-$6,000 because he was not sure he had insurance 
and that was what he felt his loss was at the time. His proof 
of loss statement listed $544 for sheetrock when there was no 
sheetrock in the walls that burned. From this evidence, the 
prosecutor could properly argue that Wardle believed the value 
of his building to be about $6,000 and that his $25,000 claim 
was inflated and padded. Thus, an objection to the 
prosecutor's argument would not have been well taken. We find 
no deficiency in counsel's performance in this regard. 
Next, wardle contends that counsel " -.JI . "I.JSS in allowing 
the State to introduce, without objection! improper opinion 
evidence which was clearly prejudicial to defendant." 
Prejudice is established where this Court's confidence in tl le 
verdict is undermined because there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a different result if counsel had not performed 
deficiently- State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Assuming arguendo that counsel was deficient in 
not objecting to the experts* insertion of Wardle's name i n 
their hypotheses as to how the fire started, we find no 
prejudice. Wardle was the last known person in the building 
prior to the fire. He was there shortly before the fire. An 
accelerant was applied to the fire. Wardle*s failure to see or 
smell the smoldering iron next to his desk where the fire 
originated is inexplicable. We find it highly improbable that 
the jury found Wardle guilty because his name was mentioned by 
the experts. Wardle*s "accident" explanation placed his 
credibility squarely at odds with that of the experts, even 
without Blundell's commentary on the divergent testimony. 
Because Wardle has not demonstrated prejudice, his conviction 
must stand. See State v. Frame, 723 P,2d 401 405 (Utah ] 986). 
We have carefully considered Wardle"" s remaining claim 
regarding the trial court's failure to cjive HI iury 
i nst ruct ion ^ and we conclude i f i s ii'if-i I 1 < i\ 
3. The brief contains a single page of argument and cites a 
single case as follows; "See State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 
(Utah 198.- • ' t inq rases) ." 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) ' 
Case No. 890372-CA 
!' 1 .a i nil i I 1 11mi Il l i ' i p h p i j i i d e i i t | 
v s , ) 
WAYNE S. WARDLE, ) 
P r i o r i t y No. 2 
£ I  e £ e 11 iJ a 111 • i m 11,1 A y p e 1 1 mi i m I « ]I  
REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ..ARGUMENT 
The State * s alternative fraud theory i s completely 
unsupported by a ii] competent or persiiasi v e evidence
 a n cj the 
Defendant was prejudiced by :ross-examination and argument 
calculated to establish his guilt under such a theory. 
Furthermore. the Defendan I: i ; • as I n i fa :i r] ] preji id I ze ::::i ii :i: i 
cross-examination by innuendo which was calculated tc • destroy 1 lis 
credibility, 
Fi na ] Il I,,. ,, ! In I i irhlpquricy n I t lifj "", -" 
instruction would have been substantially cured haa > proposed 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" ins* auction be^p civ^n m d the 
Defendant 1 i a s preser i e< I h ii EIII :I : i jht 1 ::) 
by exceptions taken i n the t ri al con rt. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AS A RESULT OF 
UNWARRANTED AND PREJUDICIAL ATTACKS UPON HIS 
CHARACTER AND CREDIBILITY. 
The State contends: "Defendant's claims of unfair 
prejudice rest upon his misleading representation of the facts 
presented at trial and his mischaracterization of the cross-
examination about his finances as impeachment." Resp. Br. at 8, 
In addressing the issue involving the alternative fraud 
theory, the State argues that the record contains competent and 
persuasive evidence establishing that the Defendant's building "was 
not worth more than $13,000." Resp. Br. at 8. 
The testimony to which the State refers follows: 
A. [BY MR. JENSEN] 
* * * 
As far as the amount, the amount that was requested 
by an independent agent that had coverage through 
our company, he set the amount. I think it was 
probably an excessive guess, because I think we 
have a contractor that looked at it and said he 
could have probably rebuilt the building back to 
the condition it was in for less than half of what 
the insurance was on the building. 
Q. He could have rebuilt that particular building 
for how much? 
A. I think he mentioned right around $13,000. 
[Emphasis added] 
T. 148-149. 
As a general rule, if hearsay evidence is admitted 
without objection, it becomes competent evidence admissible for all 
2 
purposes . See generally., Ajmril ''"I" ' L III"! <M li'll), ttwctiun i ( I % J ) . 
However, this rule "does not operate to make objectionable 
testimony conclusi ve proof of the matter asserted therein. The 
fact tl lat i t: was hearsay • ilc e s i 10 t prevei it its use as proof no I ar 
as :i t has probative value, but t .h i s i s 1 imi ted to the extent of 
whatever rationa 1 persuasi ve power it may have." State v Romero, 
'lilii,,1 III11, "(J / H I M l . l I IMI IM ] 960) (reversing a burglary conviction, based 
substantially upon hearsay which was admitted without objection). 
In S t a t e v . Me Garni „ I I? Aim/ "!(», Ii4l"i II1 ,M HI I l I 4 1 1 ' | , 
t h e d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l e d h i s c o n v i c t i o n MM loui c o u n t s ut f o r g e r y . 
The o n l y proof t h a t c e r t a i n s i g n a t u r e s were iiiiiMiiiuthorized was 
pi ".virlpfl 1 lhi i . Mil jllii h e a r s a y I M-^f-iiMii | "I llu-;- ai iiivii t i in, f ln-i 'm i-i-aid 
Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t where dn e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m i n a l 
o f f e n s e was e s t a b l i s h e d s o l e l y by h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e , I'lie a d m i s s i o n 
of t h e herirsii v Hil I ufirlaniinit. ii 1 aa I nr Jiequn i i \u\ i pveifaal , 
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e t a c t t h a t t h e h e a r s a y had been a d m i t t e d w i t h o u t 
o b j e c t i o n . 
See a l s o Glei u i v Ui l i t e d S t a t e s , (1 9 59 , C ft 6 ,fI en. l ) 2 3 1 
F.2d 880 . Cf. Kilcrore v . S t a t e , 25 Okl . Cr. 69 , 21 9 P ] 6 0 (1923) 
(motion for directed verd 1 ct should have beei i granted where proof 
' ( sseii/tl a ] e] eiitei i t of the offense w as merely hearsay) . 
Defei idant concedes that t r i a l counsel failed to interpose 
any objection I t e s t i m o n y r e q a r d l n q uli I smiim u n d i s c l o s e d 
L'uiiLractin I Il IisyenJly uailL UUJUJII .I I I he probable1 '1 anst ut 
r e p l a c i n g t h e b u i l d i n g . T h i s e q u i v o c a l hearsay i s , as a m a t t e r of 
l a w # i n s u f f i c i e n t t o suppoi I ut i^'r> i<*< I i II i I l a i a a l IVI I i ninil 
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theory. 
The mischief created by the introduction of this hearsay 
was later compounded by the prosecutor's innuendo suggesting that 
the statement regarding the cost of reconstructing the building had 
been made by the Defendant himself: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Is it true it only cost $13,000 
to put a new building on the site where the old one 
burned down? 
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] That isn't true. 
Q. Did you ever tell Mic Jensen that? 
A. What? 
Q. That it only cost $13,000 to put up a new 
building where the old one went down? 
A. I think you misunderstood the conversation. 
Q. I'm asking you, sir, did you ever tell him that? 
A. I don't believe so. 
T. 336. 
After combing through the Proof of Loss Statement, the 
State has come up with what it believes is further evidence of the 
inflation of the insurance claim. 
The Proof of Loss statement provided in the 
appendix of the defendant's brief lists an estimate 
of $544 for sheetrock for the office wall, yet, 
prior to the fire, there was no sheetrock on the 
walls in the area of the office that burned (T.37, 
87-88, 104). There was only thin wood paneling 
with no sheetrock underneath (T.37). 
Resp. Br. at 9. 
This is a theory that was never approached by the 
prosecutor at trial. The State would have this Court speculate 
concerning the relative cost of restoring the office area with 
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sheetrock walls and the cost of restoring the walls with wood 
paneling and from that conjecture find a suff ic ient basis for 
arguing the Defendant's gu i l t on the alternative fraud theory. 
The State concludes that the foregoing "evidence" 
demonstrates the prosecutor's good faith in cross-examination and 
argument which suggested that i t was a "cop-out" for the Defendant 
to hire a public adjuster to evaluate his loss and criminal for him 
to submit a Proof of Loss Statement without personally verifying 
each item.1 
In c l o s i n g , the prosecutor argued: 
He claims no knowledge about the proof of l o s s , which i s 
troubling a l s o . Here's a man who submits a claim t o the 
insurance company for $24,900.00, s igns i t on the bottom 
saying i t ' s t rue , correct and accurate, and yet on the stand 
yesterday he sa id: I don't r e a l l y know too much about i t , I 
hired a couple of public adjustors to take care of the 
s i t u a t i o n . 
Well, that in r e a l i t y i s a cop-out by the Defendant t o say I 
don't know what the po l i cy i s a l l about, I don't know what the 
proof of l o s s i s a l l about, and yet I'm going t o rece ive that 
money from the insurance company. 
T. 371. 
The State takes a similar position in its brief on appeal. Resp. Br. 
at 10. 
In fact, under cross-examination, the Defendant testified: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] And it's your testimony to the jury that you 
didn't know anything at all about what went into the Proof of 
Loss? 
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] No, I read it. I understand the Proof 
and Loss exactly. 
Q. Not only did you read it, Mr. Wardle, you signed it? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Acknowledging the contents of that Proof of Loss is true 
and correct? 
A. I believe that it is true and correct. 
T. 333. 
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The State attempts to justify the destructive cross-
examination on the subject of the Defendant's "financial interest•" 
A relevant inquiry would have directly approached the Defendant's 
financial condition at the time of the fire. Instead, the 
prosecutor chose to paint the Defendant as dishonest in his 
business dealings and in his denial of the prosecutor's specific 
questions for which the jury would surely assume there existed a 
good-faith basis.2 
The State suggests that the impeaching character of the 
inquiry should be disregarded and the prosecutor should not be 
required to establish good faith in making the inquiry because the 
evidence was introduced for the purpose of establishing the 
Defendant's "financial interest" and "was not sought for 
impeachment of defendant's credibility." Resp. Br. at 13. 
The State then suggests that the authorities cited by the 
Defendant should be distinguished because the impeachment in the 
instant case does not arise out of questioning involving prior 
felony convictions. Resp. Br. at 14-15. 
Finally, the State attempts to downplay the impact of 
this line of questioning and the prosecutor's failure to offer 
rebuttal by pointing out that, in his closing argument, the 
prosecutor conceded that he had failed to establish any evidence of 
financial motive. Resp. Br. at 13. 
2
"The prosecuting attorney may well be assumed to be a man of fair standing 
before the jury; and they may well have thought that he would not have asked the 
question unless he could have proved what it intimated if he had been allowed to 
do so." People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 462, 34 Pac. 1078, 1079 (1893). 
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State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P.2d 920 (1947), was 
an appeal from a murder conviction. The "very heart" of the 
defendant's theory of self-defense lie in establishing his 
reputation for being a peaceable man. On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked the defendant three times whether or not he had 
threatened a third party by the name of Menacey. Three times the 
defendant denied it. The State contended that "this line of 
questioning was not put to lay the foundation for impeachment, but 
was designed to rebut defendant's claim of self defense and on that 
basis was both admissible and proper." 182 P.2d at 929. In 
reversing the conviction, the Arizona Supreme Court stated: 
[W]hen, as here, such questioning is raised and 
then dropped with no further attempt on the part of 
the State to prove its point, the aforementioned 
"fishing expedition" having failed, we believe it 
to be wholly improper and highly prejudicial. To 
allow this sort of examination would be to allow 
the imaginative and overzealous prosecutor to 
concoct a damaging line of examination which could 
leave with the jury the impression that defendant 
was anything that the questions, by innuendo, 
seemed to suggest. If the questions were 
persistent enough and cleverly enough framed, no 
amount of denial on the part of a defendant would 
be able to erase the impression in the mind of the 
jury that the prosecutor actually had such facts at 
hand and that probably there was some truth to the 
insinuations. 
182 P.2d at 930. 
The condemnation of innuendo has never been limited to 
situations where the tactic is used to imply the existence of a 
prior criminal record. See ABA, Code of Professional 
Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(l); ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 
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3-5.7(d);3 6 Wiomore, Evidence, Section 1808(2)(Chadbourn rev. 
1976). 
No trial lawyer could read pages 342 through 355 of the 
transcript and conclude that the mischief introduced thereby was 
remedied by the prosecutor's concession that he had failed to 
establish a financial motive for the fire. 
It has been said that cross-examination is the most 
effective machine devised for getting at the truth. Cross-
examination by innuendo is the most effective machine devised for 
creating the illusion of truth and the illusion of effective 
impeachment. The power of innuendo lies in deception. It breeds 
suspicion and spawns skepticism. It cuts to the very core of a 
defense based primarily upon the accused's credibility. It is a 
dangerous tactic which has no place in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. 
This was trial by innuendo, guilt by impeachment. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF THE JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES. 
The S t a t e acknowledges t h a t t h e Defendant proposed a 
" r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e h y p o t h e s i s " i n s t r u c t i o n which t h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t r e f u s e d t o g i v e . The S t a t e f u r t h e r acknowledges t h a t t h e 
3
"It i s an improper t a c t i c for the prosecutor t o attempt t o communicate 
impressions by innuendo through quest ions that would be t o the defendant's 
advantage t o answer in the negat ive , for example, 'Have you ever been convicted 
of the crime of robbery?' or 'Weren't you a member of the Communist party?' or 
'Did you t e l l Mr. X that ?' when the quest ioner has no evidence t o support the 
innuendo.n Comment, ABA, Standards of Criminal J u s t i c e 3 - 5 . 7 . 
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Defendant took exception to the district court's refusal to give 
the proposed instruction. However, the State argues that the 
Defendant has waived his right to a review of the adequacy of the 
instructions given because trial counsel did not take exception to 
the "reasonable doubt" instruction. What the State fails to 
recognize is that the inadequacy of the "reasonable doubt" 
instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given. 
The precise deficiency of which Defendant complains was 
recognized by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1382 (Utah 1989): 
Finally, I submit that it is inappropriate to 
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a 
possibility, as the instruction in this case does. 
Possibilities may or may not create doubt. 
Depending on the circumstances, a possibility may 
constitute a reasonable doubt. Whether a ^ 
possibility is sufficient to create a reasonable 
doubt depends upon the likelihood of the 
possibility. Certainly a fanciful or wholly 
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. But the instruction does 
not make the point clear. 
An instruction that a reasonable doubt must be a 
"real, substantial doubt, and not one that is 
merely possible or imaginary" has been held to be 
erroneous because, in practical effect, it tends to 
diminish the prosecutor's burden of proof by 
implying that the prosecution need not obviate a 
real or substantial doubt. [Citation omitted] 
In my view, the trial court's instruction was 
clearly erroneous and ought to be so declared. 
In Ireland the majority affirmed the defendant's 
conviction but noted: 
We do acknowledge however, that the dissent's 
criticisms of the "more weighty affairs of life" 
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language is justified and share Justice Stewart's 
concern that the "possible or imaginary" language 
might, by implication, be understood to diminish 
the prosecutor's standard of proof. Therefore, in 
our supervisory capacity, we direct the trial 
courts to discontinue use of that language in their 
instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt. 
773 P.2d at 1380. 
The problems discussed in Ireland are presented 
foursquare by the exception that was taken in the trial court. In 
the instant case, the Defendant does not claim personal knowledge 
of all of the circumstances which led to the fire. He was left to 
answer the charges by declaring his innocence and proposing 
possible explanations which incorporated the circumstances as he 
understood them to be. Clearly the refusal to give the "reasonable 
alternative hypothesis" instruction was error where the "reasonable 
doubt" instruction suggested the inadequacy of a defense based upon 
"possible" explanations for the origin of the fire. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the State's alternative 
fraud theory is completely unsupported by any competent or 
persuasive evidence. The Defendant was prejudiced by cross-
examination and argument calculated to establish his guilt under 
such a theory. 
Furthermore, the Defendant was unfairly prejudiced in 
cross-examination by innuendo which was calculated to destroy his 
credibility. 
Finally, the inadequacy of the "reasonable doubt" 
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instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given and the 
Defendant has preserved his right to appellate review of this issue 
by exceptions taken in the trial court. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Defendant's 
convictions should be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial. 
DATED this AlAlk day of February, 1990. 
hi 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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